

UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

PRESENTATION TO THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Subject: Fiscal Year 2027 Priorities and Posture of United States Space Command

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Introduction

Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to present U.S. Space Command's (USSPACECOM) priorities and posture for Fiscal Year (FY) 2027. This testimony addresses a strategic reality that has only grown more urgent. The United States must accelerate our advantage in space to defend our Homeland, maintain our way of life, and deter strategic opponents. To do so, we will continue to build a synchronized, agile, and combat-ready space enterprise, while enhancing burden sharing and interoperability with allies and partners to ensure we can prevail in any conflict. At USSPACECOM, our priorities are to prepare and posture to deter conflict and prevail if required; offset the growing array of threats we now see postured against our space systems; expand and strengthen key relationships across the Joint Force and with Interagency, allied, commercial, and academic partners; and expand a warfighting advantage in space.

Space-based capabilities underpin every modern military operation. From positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) to global communications, missile warning, and real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), space systems enhance the effectiveness of our Joint Force across all domains enabling unmatched precision, speed, accuracy, and reach. These capabilities are evidenced in the last three weeks during Operation EPIC FURY, Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER, the U.S. military strikes on Iranian nuclear-related targets in June 2025, and Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE, the law enforcement operation that brought Nicolás Maduro to justice this past January, demonstrating the Joint Force's unique ability to integrate terrestrial warfighting forces, Special Operations Forces, cyber capabilities, and space effects to fulfill mission objectives. If an adversary degrades, denies, or destroys our space capabilities, the Joint Force's ability to fight as it is designed and sized is immediately and materially

impaired. Recognizing space as both key military terrain and a force multiplier requires investing in space and ground systems and personnel that enable the operational resiliency, lethality, flexibility, and agility to preserve our advantages in crisis and in conflict against the threats we now face.

Because space is central to the Joint Force's military advantage, our potential adversaries are aggressively developing capabilities to deny us its use. China has integrated space-enabled effects into their land, maritime, air, and rocket forces to make them more far-ranging, lethal, and precise, and they have fielded capabilities purpose-built to disrupt or destroy our space systems. These developments threaten to hold our Joint Force, in all domains, at risk and demonstrate that control of the space environment shapes outcomes on land, at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace. USSPACECOM's mission is to ensure that the U.S., working with our allies and partners, has the freedom of action to operate in space as we see fit and the ability to project power when and where required. We must maintain the capacity to establish space superiority at a time and place of our choosing to defend American interests in space and to enable freedom of action across the Joint Force. That requires not only technical superiority, but also doctrine, training, and command relationships that reflect space's centrality to Joint and multi-national operations.

This is a moment of urgency, as potential opponents are deploying greater numbers and types of layered counterspace weapons designed to erode our advantages and complicate our decision-making. The rapid delivery and diversity of these threats demand a proactive posture: faster acquisition, resilient architectures, distributed systems, and integrated command and control that can withstand attack and enable rapid recovery. We must close capability gaps and field non-kinetic and kinetic options that are visible, credible, maneuverable, defensible,

resilient, and sustainable. Delay risks ceding initiative and increasing the cost of restoring deterrence in crisis.

Success in space is fundamentally a collective effort. Given its vastness, no single nation, agency, Military Service, command, or company can secure the space domain alone. Our commercial partners provide innovation and capacity; our Interagency and Joint Force teammates provide unique capabilities and jointly protect and defend our space systems with us; and our allies and partners enhance deterrence, extend reach, increase resilience, provide strategic and operational flexibility, and shoulder regional burdens. While we have made great progress in the 6.5 years since we were reestablished, USSPACECOM will continue to deepen collaboration with interagency, international, commercial, and academic partners to present a unified, deterrent posture and to coordinate responses when crisis escalates.

In this testimony, I will detail how USSPACECOM is aligning forces and operational plans to preserve our advantages, deter aggression, and, if necessary, achieve victory in any conflict that extends to or begins in space. USSPACECOM appreciates the significant investments made by Congress, which has been demonstrated through the reconciliation funding bill and, more recently, the authorities and resources within the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act and Department of Defense Appropriations Act. These bills provide enhanced military construction funding authority to accelerate the establishment of our permanent headquarters in Huntsville, Alabama—ensuring our future Command and Control Facility is purpose built to meet evolving threats—and secures the development and resourcing of key space capabilities championed by the Military Departments and Agencies. We look forward to these investments accelerating the modernization of our space and missile defense systems to maintain our nation's advantage in space. Looking ahead, we seek the Committee's continued

support to expedite capability delivery, deepen our partnerships, and fully equip USSPACECOM with the resources necessary to defend the Nation, enable the Joint Force, and secure peace through strength.

Transformative Threats

Today we face concurrent and accelerating threats that are no longer future possibilities but current operational realities. These threats span terrestrial, on-orbit, and cyber capabilities, holding U.S. and partner space systems at risk in all orbital regimes and restricting the Joint and Combined Force's freedom of action across all domains. Novel and unprecedented developments—like China's space-enabled kill chains, Russia's pursuit of an on-orbit nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, and the proliferation of advanced ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles—compound these challenges. At the same time, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are expanding coordinated space activity across lunar exploration, launch services, remote sensing, and military space capabilities. This cooperation blends Chinese lunar ambitions and global ground infrastructure with Russian launch and legacy lunar expertise, while Iran and North Korea leverage access, technology transfer, and partner enablement to advance satellite programs.

People's Republic of China

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues its breathtaking pace of space and counterspace development, viewing space as critical to achieving its goal of becoming the world's preeminent power by 2045. China's on-orbit presence has grown exponentially, now operating over 1,300 active satellites—a six hundred percent increase since 2015—demonstrating a clear intent to operationalize space as a warfighting domain. This includes more than 500 ISR satellites that enhance the People's Liberation Army's ability to find, fix, track,

target, and engage U.S. and coalition forces with long-range, precision missiles. This space-enabled "kill chain" is designed to limit our operational freedom in the Indo-Pacific.

And while that capability threatens our forces in-theater, the CCP's ongoing nuclear expansion poses a direct strategic risk to the U.S. Homeland. This expansion is characterized by both novel delivery systems, designed to circumvent our defenses, and a dramatic increase in traditional missile capacity. For instance, the CCP continues to develop Hypersonic Glide Vehicles and a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, which can approach from any direction to evade our early warning radars. In parallel, Beijing is rapidly growing its land-based arsenal, having unveiled the DF-61, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in September 2025 and having constructed over 300 new silos for solid-fuel ICBMs. These developments underscore the urgency of Golden Dome for America (GDA) missile defense architecture, which is designed to shield the Homeland by detecting, tracking, and defeating a range of space-enabled threats, leveraging key space technologies like improved space-based tracking and space-based interceptors.

Furthermore, the CCP continues to field a robust suite of counterspace weapons to blind and deafen our forces by disrupting or destroying our satellites. These include direct-ascent ASAT missiles, ground-based lasers, jammers, and maneuverable co-orbital ASATs and "dual-use" satellites like the Shijian-21 (SJ-21), which can target the satellites we rely upon for Homeland defense. In 2025, China launched the dual-use Shijian-25 (SJ-25) satellite to geosynchronous orbit and likely extended the mission life of the SJ-21 via a docking and refueling demonstration. This activity, combined with a 2024 demonstration of complex, close-approach maneuvers between multiple satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), illustrates that China is actively developing maneuver, refueling, and potentially re-arming capabilities for its

counterspace systems, showcasing a burgeoning on-orbit logistics and sustainment capability. China is expanding its military options for sustained offensive operations against the satellites we rely on to defend the Homeland and project power. These developments intend to degrade our current space superiority and potentially give China a maneuver and logistics advantage in space, something we would not accept on the land, at sea, or in the air.

Russian Federation

Russia remains a formidable and increasingly less predictable opponent, and its aggression in Ukraine has likely encouraged a greater reliance on its nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities. Moscow views space as critical for modern warfare, increasingly focusing on counterspace programs as a key asymmetric advantage, designed to negate the conventional superiority of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Most alarming is Russia's continued development of a nuclear-armed ASAT weapon designed for placement in orbit. Russia's pursuit of such a weapon constitutes the single greatest threat to the space domain. A nuclear detonation in space would cause catastrophic uncontrollable harm to military and civilian objects alike, without distinction creating a devastating radiation environment in LEO. This would destroy thousands of satellites vital for global security and prosperity, and render LEO unusable for all nations for years. We cannot tolerate the placement of such a weapon into space, an act which would also violate the Outer Space Treaty, to which Russia is a party.

Russia is actively pursuing and fielding counterspace capabilities for all orbital regimes and is continuing to test its Nudol ground-based, direct-ascent ASAT missile, which created a dangerous debris field that endangered the International Space Station during a 2021 test. In 2025, Moscow continued to use electromagnetic warfare, such as jamming the Global

Positioning System and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) in regions like the Baltics, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea, causing flight diversions and degrading GNSS accuracy. Such actions demonstrate a willingness to degrade both civilian and military space systems. Russia's expanding space cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea furthers the risk of conflict escalation.

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran's expanding missile and space programs, while significantly less sophisticated than those of China or Russia, represent a direct and growing threat to regional stability and U.S. interests. In the past year, the world witnessed Iran's willingness to use its ballistic missile arsenal in direct state-on-state conflict, launching over 500 ballistic missiles in mass salvos during the 12-Day War against Israel. Iran possesses the largest and most diverse ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East and continues to improve the lethality and precision of these systems. Tehran's space program is of dual-use concern; its development of space launch vehicles (SLV), such as the Safir, directly contributes to its ability to develop longer-range ballistic missiles. In 2025, the Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that Iran could leverage its SLVs to develop a militarily workable intercontinental ballistic missile by 2035. This threat is compounded by Iran's continued proliferation of missile technology to its network of proxies across the Middle East and its transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia. Iran's activities demonstrate a clear intent to use missile and space capabilities to hold U.S. and coalition forces at risk.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

North Korea continues to prioritize regime survival and international legitimacy through the expansion of its military and technological capabilities. Pyongyang now fields a diverse

arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of threatening the U.S. Homeland, Joint Forces in the Indo-Pacific, and our allies and partners. In the past year, North Korea has reached several ballistic missile milestones, including conducting test launches of the Hwasong-16 intermediate-range ballistic missile with hypersonic glide vehicle, which landed in the Sea of Japan, and several short-range ballistic missiles. While Pyongyang did not launch a satellite into orbit in the past year, they continued to advance their military-space capabilities, including upgrading launch infrastructure and deepening their space-technology sharing partnership with Russia. In addition to its kinetic arsenal, North Korea maintains multiple offensive cyber and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities, including GPS and satellite communications jamming. These efforts demonstrate clear intent to hold space-enabled military and civilian systems at risk during conflict.

Homeland Defense

Defending the Homeland is our most fundamental duty. USSPACECOM is responsible for the space-based capabilities that form the bedrock of this defense, from missile warning, to PNT, to secure communications. In Fiscal Year 2025, USSPACECOM made strides in strengthening the defense of our Homeland. Throughout USSPACECOM's Year of Command and Control, we've matured our command and control framework to ensure we can decisively fulfill our missile warning and missile tracking responsibilities, and deliver that information to our national leaders at the speed of war.

Our enduring missions are core to Homeland defense. Our sensors detected and tracked over 6,000 missile launches worldwide in 2025, providing critical data to Combatant Commanders in support of warfighting units. These important sensors operated by USSPACECOM components are essential to enabling both missile warning and missile defense

capabilities and ensuring the safety of U.S. military units, allies, and partners. Additionally, in support of operations in the Middle East, USSPACECOM assisted U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and the Missile Defense Agency, in sensor asset management. We also oversee operations of forward-positioned and CONUS-based radars, such as AN/TPY-2 radars and the Long-Range Discrimination Radar, and their associated communication networks, key components of the United States global missile defense architecture.

Also vital to Homeland Defense, we reinforced our partnerships through wargames such as NIMBLE TITAN, an international campaign of missile defense experimentation that explores integrated air and missile defense policies and capabilities. These events allow us to exchange best practices and examine new approaches to counter the expanded range and maneuverability of advanced missile threats. Additionally, as the executive agent for missile defense training and education for the Joint Force and our allies and partners through our Joint Staff-accredited Center of Excellence, USSPACECOM focuses on sensors, intercept capabilities, and joint integrated air and missile defense doctrine to ensure maximum readiness for the Homeland Defense mission. Our current posture and deep expertise in these mission areas ensure we are prepared to expand our scope to support and execute emergent GDA initiatives.

A key effort in enabling critical command and control functions and ensuring continuity of operations for Homeland Defense is the modernization of our Satellite Communications (SATCOM) ground infrastructure. The Resilient Ground Infrastructure (RGI) and Space Data Network (SDN) initiatives enhance the resilience, capacity, and agility of SATCOM systems that underpin missile warning, missile defense, and secure communications. These efforts give warfighters faster, more dependable access to critical SATCOM resources, enabling

uninterrupted command and control capabilities even in contested environments. The SDN integrates proliferated LEO and MEO SATCOM constellations into the overall SATCOM enterprise to deliver flexible, high-capacity, low-latency networks. RGI focuses on ground optimization and provides resiliency by leveraging open architectures, software-defined networking, and virtualization to enable agile ground-segment changes that keep pace with an increasingly dynamic space segment. Congressional funding is instrumental to the modernization of our SATCOM ground enterprise, and I would like to express my appreciation for your support.

Looking at Fiscal Year 2027 and beyond, our priorities focus on maintaining space superiority and supporting terrestrial operations. We will pursue deeper, globally integrated planning with the Joint Force to ensure the defense of key national space capabilities and enable terrestrial schemes of maneuver in any area of responsibility. We will continue our integration with all Combatant Commands (CCMDs) by leveraging the Joint Staff's ELITE CONSTELLATION exercise. ELITE CONSTELLATION provides a critical opportunity for multiple CCMDs to exercise their war plans simultaneously.

Finally, a central element of Homeland Defense is the GDA initiative, which addresses the urgent need to counter increasingly advanced threats. Our potential adversaries are actively developing and deploying a new generation of sophisticated weapons, creating a threat landscape that is real, complex, and rapidly evolving. From ballistic and hypersonic missiles to advanced cruise missiles and other aerial systems, these dangers place the U.S. Homeland at significant risk. Our legacy deterrent forces and Homeland Defense strategy were not designed to confront this evolving reality. GDA represents a next-generation defensive shield for America, designed to deter attacks and defend the American people against the full spectrum of modern space and

missile threats. The President's Executive Order calls for space-based interceptors and sensors which, when fielded and operational, will both reinforce the credibility of our deterrence and increase the flexibility with which USSPACECOM can protect the Joint Force and the Homeland from threats transiting through our Area of Responsibility. GDA is an investment in our nation's security and a guarantee of our ability to respond decisively if attacked.

Deterrence

Deterrence in space requires credible capabilities, seamless integration with our partners, clear communication, and a demonstrated will to act. In Fiscal Year 2025, USSPACECOM continued to advance deterrence through execution of our campaign plan, the strategic framework to prioritize full integration of our Military Services, allies and partners, and commercial partners toward our strategic objectives. We execute this plan by synchronizing operations, activities, and investments across the Joint Force, with interagency partners and our closest allies, and strengthening integrated deterrence and readiness in line with the National Defense Strategy.

A key element of our deterrence strategy is operational integration with the Joint Force, our interagency partners, and international partners. In the Indo-Pacific, our work with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and regional allies and partners, demonstrated in Joint exercises like PACIFIC FURY and our consistent, biennial support to Exercise TALISMAN SABRE with Australia, enhances deterrence through coordinated space operations and robust information sharing that denies opponents opportunities and raises the costs of aggression. To enable this, we have expanded our use of the Trusted Network Environment, the Department of the Air Force's cross-domain solution that enables secure, bi-directional, information-sharing through U.S. BICES, delivering real-time, cross-domain data exchange, accelerating digital

interoperability and allied decision cycles, and reinforcing deterrence by rapid, collective awareness.

We advanced command and control alignment by developing and approving a Strategic Space Command and Control concept of operations and strengthening data-fusion, artificial intelligence, and machine learning (AI/ML) capabilities. Recent wargames confirmed these concepts and demonstrated coalition strength and effectiveness. Over the past year, APOLLO PHOENIX 25 confirmed our ability to provide assured satellite communications access to a twelve-nation, multinational coalition in a contested environment, while APOLLO GRIFFIN 25 improved our coordination across CCMDs during a large-scale conflict. Exercises like GLOBAL SENTINEL further stress-test our enterprise and demonstrate credible combat power and the resolve of our combined force.

During our APOLLO NEXUS and APOLLO GRIFFIN exercises, we confirmed the critical role allied capabilities and authorities play in competition and conflict. In APOLLO NEXUS 25, we demonstrated the fusion of space, cyber, and Special Operations forces, including a partner-enabled commercial electronic surveillance system and a new electronic surveillance capability from U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Exercises such as ZULU KEPLER 25 further embedded our allies and partners into staff and command and control processes. In addition, coordinated rendezvous and proximity operations with the U.K. and France showcased our ability to conduct dynamic, responsible, and integrated space operations—solidifying practical interoperability and shared decision-making under complex conditions.

Throughout the year, we conducted activities crucial for the Joint Force, allies, and partners worldwide. We provided critical support to USEUCOM operations, delivering secure communications and space-based ISR. We supported USCENTCOM by providing vital missile

warning and communications capabilities to U.S. and allied forces during the 12-Day War, and space-based systems enabled effects for Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER and Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE. We brought into operation the Advanced Tracking and Launch Analysis System (ATLAS) to unify sensor data, delivering a comprehensive space domain awareness picture, signaling resilient, reliable support to the Joint Force and the potential for future improvements in space domain awareness.

To deter our potential adversaries and maintain superiority in space, USSPACECOM is advocating for a critical strategic shift from a predictable, static posture to dynamic maneuver warfare. The core of this new operational focus is to operate our space assets with the same freedom of action as forces in the air, on land, and at sea, thereby complicating adversary targeting, creating uncertainty, and imposing risk on any potential aggressor.

However, true maneuver warfare cannot be achieved as long as our on-orbit platforms are constrained by the finite resources they carry at launch. This limiting factor creates a "psychology of scarcity," constraining a commander's willingness to use assets dynamically, limiting our ability to conduct real-world training, and inhibiting the full benefits of mission command.

A robust in-domain logistics network would enable sustained space maneuver and ensure operational superiority. Just as the Joint Forces are replenished on the move in other domains, sustaining our warfighting platforms in orbit would begin with advancing on-orbit refueling and extend to leveraging in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing technologies to enhance resilience and flexibility. Our operational intent is to mature these technologies to enable maneuver warfare in space—a capability essential for sustaining our advantage in space.

Through our national and commercial launch capabilities, such as the Space Force's launch ranges as well as SpaceX's Starship rocket and Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket, our ability to quickly and overwhelmingly redeploy and reconstitute our on-orbit assets reliably in a contested environment is a national strategic advantage and outpaces all our potential opponents. Therefore, we must fortify and accelerate this advantage in space logistics and sustainment. By partnering with the Office of the Secretary of War and the Space Force to accelerate maneuver and sustainment functions, we intend to deliver a more lethal, combat-ready, and resilient force capable of achieving and maintaining space superiority in any conflict.

To maintain deterrence, we cannot just rely on a resilient or defensive posture. Acquiring credible space superiority capabilities, or integrated space fires, is a strategic imperative. These weapons are essential to deter conflict, providing a clear and convincing message to potential aggressors that the costs of threatening U.S. and allied interests in space will be too high. By investing in these capabilities, we ensure our ability to prevail in any conflict that may extend into the space domain, safeguarding our military advantage.

Ensuring access to the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is essential to our ongoing operations. We are advocating through the Department of War (DoW) Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the Military Services for Dynamic Spectrum Sharing to unite U.S. commercial and military power in the EMS, fostering innovation while securing our warfighting capabilities. We appreciate the spectrum protections included in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and are developing spectrum studies and operational assessments on impacts to our assigned missions. These studies and assessments will support the DoW CIO efforts to meet the Presidential guidance outlined in the December 19, 2025 'Winning the 6G Space' memorandum.

The health and resilience of our Defense Industrial Base is also a fundamental pillar of credible deterrence for USSPACECOM. Our ability to deter aggression in space hinges not only on the capabilities we possess today, but in our actual capacity to endure conflict and reconstitute our forces under stress. A clear example of this is our command's strong advocacy for onshoring the production of hydrazine. This critical satellite propellant is essential for on-orbit maneuverability—a cornerstone of dynamic space operations. Reliance on fragile, overseas supply chains creates a strategic vulnerability and a single point of failure. Securing a domestic source of hydrazine directly removes this vulnerability, tangibly strengthening our defensive posture and enhancing our overall deterrent by ensuring our on-orbit staying power is not easily compromised.

Priorities and Burden Sharing

As we look to Fiscal Year 2027, our primary objective is to deliver a decisive warfighting advantage to the Joint Force. Achieving this objective requires advancing our top warfighting priorities: delivering integrated space fires; active protection measures; enhancing battlespace awareness; fielding integrated command and control capabilities; enabling sustained space maneuver; and ensuring robust cyber defense. These priorities are not isolated capability needs, but interconnected pillars that collectively strengthen our ability to operate effectively in contested environments. To accelerate the integration of these capabilities across the Joint Force, we will aggressively operationalize AI/ML, modernize our decision cycles, and ensure we can deliver coordinated effects at the speed of relevance.

As we pursue these priorities, our success depends on the strength of our partnerships. USSPACECOM continues to deepen our integration with the Joint Force and commercial and international partners to ensure unity of effort in space operations. In 2025, Multinational Force—

Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (MNF-OOD) planned and conducted two on-orbit operations with multinational information components, conducting rendezvous and proximity operations between U.S. and allies' satellites with space domain awareness coordinated across the seven-nation partnership. Additionally, our Commercial Integration Cell and Joint Commercial Operations cell continue their work to achieve synchronized space effects between industry and our Joint and Combined Force. We also appointed a Royal Canadian Air Force Brigadier General as our Deputy Combined Joint Force Space Component Commander.

Our 2025 Year of Command and Control initiative focused on building a more comprehensive, interoperable, and agile command and control structure. We built more robust relationships with NATO Headquarters, Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe, Allied Command Transformation, and the Combined Space Force Component Command to better deliver global space operations in support of NATO's deterrence and defense mission.

In Fiscal Year 2026, we will build on this foundation, as this is our Year of Integration. We are formalizing multinational orders and decision-making structures within MNF-OOD to ensure our combined forces are postured to deter aggression and defeat adversaries. We intend to continue conducting combined operations and exercises with MNF-OOD nations to strengthen this foundation. Through these activities, we are testing and refining concepts and plans for how we will achieve mission objectives in space as a combined force. We must also challenge the posture of our competitors in key regions, for example, as we partner with allies and other CCMDs to look at reducing potential adversaries' space enabling infrastructure and influence in the Western Hemisphere and around the world.

A key line of effort is to expand information sharing with our closest allies in space to foster deeper intelligence sharing and operational collaboration. We have made progress

bilaterally with select nations, and multilaterally with MNF-OOD, including the creation of an MNF-OOD specific tetragraph to improve intelligence sharing, as we conducted operational planning on operational threats and challenges. To help promote information sharing, we now have 14 liaison officers from nations in Asia, Europe, North America, and South America, and exchange officers from three additional nations.

Our goal in Fiscal Year 2027 is to deepen this integration further. We plan to expand the scope and scale of our APOLLO NEXUS exercises to incorporate more terrestrial CCMDs into the planning and execution phases, fostering a shared understanding of operational objectives across the globe. We are also evaluating the viability of integrating MNF-OOD with NATO exercises, a positive step toward expanding the effects provided by this critical multinational body. We are also committed to space cooperation with nations that are investing in their space security infrastructure and capabilities to help them do more for themselves and their regions.

To command this global coalition, we are leveraging available capabilities for a streamlined, interoperable command and control network. USSPACECOM uses a cross-domain solution across multiple platforms to deliver a common operating picture to enable mission integration, intelligence sharing, and informed decision-making with our allies and partners. Building on this foundation, we will continue to expand integration and experiment with digital systems, like MAVEN Smart System, leveraging exercises to refine operational use.

Redstone Arsenal Relocation

Headquarters Relocation and Operational Impacts

On 2 September 2025, the President designated Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, as the permanent location for Headquarters, USSPACECOM. Since that decision, we have been

fully focused on executing the President’s guidance while continuing to perform our vital national security missions without interruption.

Congressional support in the past year—through both authorities and funding—has been instrumental in enabling the Command to initiate planning, establish interim capabilities, and begin the transition to Redstone Arsenal in accordance with Presidential direction. These resources have allowed us to maintain operational momentum and ensure uninterrupted mission execution. Continued support from Congress in FY2027 is essential to accelerate completion of required infrastructure, field resilient command and control capabilities, and preserve mission readiness throughout the transition period.

To guarantee uninterrupted command and control throughout the transition, USSPACECOM will phase the relocation of personnel and missions to Redstone Arsenal and operate from interim facilities while a dedicated, purpose-built warfighting platform, designed to meet the demands of USSPACECOM’s mission needs is constructed. This phased approach—supported by our establishment of the USSPACECOM South Detachment on Redstone Arsenal—allows the Command to expeditiously relocate our warfighting organization while maintaining full operational capability during the transition.

Facilities and Requirements

Our new Command and Control Facility at Redstone Arsenal will be designed to fully meet our security, mission, and information technology requirements. It will be built leveraging the new Military Construction (MILCON) authorities in the most recent NDAA. From the outset, we are prioritizing resilient, secure network architecture and infrastructure capable of supporting global command and control operations. To support this effort, we have partnered with Naval Information Warfare Center-Pacific to leverage their expertise in Command, Control,

Communications, Computers, and Information Technology development. In parallel, we are working closely with the Military Services and supporting agencies to program and deliver their respective mission systems and networks to Redstone Arsenal. Once complete, the permanent Command and Control Facility will provide a modern, warfighting platform from which USSPACECOM can command forces, integrate as a full member of the Joint Force team, and protect and defend U.S. and allied interests in space.

Personnel Impacts

Maintaining operational readiness throughout the headquarters transition is paramount. Our people are central to mission success, and we are taking deliberate steps to keep the talent and experience of our civilian workforce. While our interim facilities are under renovation and a new Command and Control Facility is under construction, in order to preserve mission continuity in Colorado we have offered retention incentives for the civilian workforce to maintain operational readiness. As functions move to Redstone Arsenal, we will cover the cost of moving and offer relocation incentives encouraging employees to remain with the command in Huntsville for years to come. Additionally, we have begun to work with the Military Services in filling our military positions in the next assignment cycle as we rebalance the workforce between these two locations. Our approach remains focused on keeping as much mission-critical talent as possible to ensure USSPACECOM remains fully ready, capable, and lethal throughout the transition.

Conclusion

The threats we face in space are now lethal and widespread, demanding that we continuously adapt to and shape a rapidly evolving strategic environment to strengthen our advantage and maintain deterrence. These challenges demand the full strength of the Joint,

Interagency, Combined, and commercial team reinforcing USSPACECOM as we ensure their success in return.

We are at a critical juncture. Our most pressing threat, China, is marching towards its timeline to be ready to militarily compel unification with Taiwan. At the same time, Russia continues to pursue and demonstrate capabilities designed to disrupt, degrade, and destroy our space assets, including the potential placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit. We are threatened both terrestrially and on orbit with capabilities that seek not only to dull our ability to support the Joint Force, but also our ability to defend the Homeland.

Armed conflict in space is not inevitable, and USSPACECOM remains committed to preserving space as a domain for peaceful exploration, economic growth, and expanded human reach. Should deterrence fail, however, the integrated space power of our team will provide a decisive advantage in any conflict. By realizing the full potential of our integrated space enterprise and our elements of victory—being prepared to operate through a first strike by an undeterred adversary, seamlessly transitioning from crisis to conflict, integrating all effects, reconstituting our forces, and achieving space superiority—we will prevail.

Our priorities for Fiscal Year 2027 reflect our unwavering commitment to mission success. To ensure USSPACECOM can deter conflict and prevail in a contested environment, we request continued Congressional support of our key priorities. This includes fielding integrated space fires and protection, enhancing our battlespace awareness, building an integrated command and control system that provides a decisive advantage over our potential adversaries, sustaining our forces' freedom to maneuver, and providing sufficient cyber defenses of our space enterprise. These investments are vital to strengthening our operational readiness, countering emerging threats, and ensuring the security of our space capabilities. With the

continued support of Congress, USSPACECOM will remain prepared to address the evolving threat landscape, deter aggression, counter adversary actions, and safeguard America's interests in space today and for generations to come.